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Abstract 
This article analyses the use of criminal justice measures aimed at the prevention of 
sexual offending across England and Wales.  Specifically, it focusses on measures such 
as the ‘sex offenders register’ and sexual offences prevention orders (SOPOs) and the 
use of sanctions for their breach. Following a discussion of the apparent tensions 
between individual rights and public protection measures we present an original 
analysis of data collated from Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA) 
area reports over a nine-year period. Our analysis reveals considerable variation 
between areas in both the risk-level allocation of cases, the imposition of SOPOs and 
sanctions for non-compliance with MAPPA. We argue that these disparities raise issues 
concerning both the rights and autonomy of those subjected to public protection 
measures and highlight the need for further detailed research into MAPPA practices. 
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades a raft of punitive legislation intended to manage the risks 
posed by ‘known sexual offenders’ has developed.  This has included the introduction 
of supervisory oversight and monitoring of individuals in the community post-sentence 
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through the ‘Sex Offenders Register’1 and Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements, or MAPPA2 (Thomas 2011; Stone 2012). The general trend has been for 
interventions to be ‘strengthened’, ‘toughened’ and ‘tightened’ (Thomas 2008), notably 
through the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and more recently by the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 (Notification Requirements) (England and Wales) Regulations 20123. Part 2 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, for example, introduced a range of new civil preventative 
orders. These included: the sexual offences prevention order (SOPO), which replaced 
the sex offender order (introduced by s.2 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998); 
restraining orders (introduced by s.66 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 
2000); foreign travel orders, which impose travel restrictions on registered sex offenders 
(RSOs4); and risk of sexual harm orders, which can be imposed on persons who have no 
convictions of any kind (Shute 2004). Additionally, the Child Sex Offenders Disclosure 
Scheme allows for information about RSOs to be shared with the public through 
controlled disclosure (see Kemshall and Wood 2010; Kemshall et al. 2012; Chan et al. 
2010).   
Recent changes made in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
widens the use of such orders so that they can be used to manage the risk against adults 
as well as children. For example, a new Sexual Harm Prevention Order will replace the 
Sexual Offences Prevention Order and Foreign Travel Order; and the Sexual Risk Order 
(SRO) has replaced the Risk of Sexual Harm Order. Due to the civil nature of these 
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orders, the standard of proof required for their imposition is based on the balance of 
probabilities (their jurisdictional application and related debates surrounding the 
subject’s rights will be discussed later in the paper). They then essentially entail the use 
of what Kemshall and Maguire (2002:14) have termed ‘negative conditions’ to restrict 
and control the subject’s behaviour in the community.  All carry criminal penalties 
should they be breached, including up to 5 years imprisonment (Knock et al. 2002; 
Shute 2004). While designed to limit and monitor the behaviour of particular 
individuals in the interests of public protection, the gravity of these potential 
consequences for RSOs clearly underscore the importance of accurately evaluating their 
future risk of offending.  
Currently, MAPPA oversees the assessment and management of ‘high risk’ individuals, 
notably RSOs (Thomas 2011; Stone 2012). MAPPA utilises an inter-agency approach 
to the operational practices involved in the risk assessment, supervision, surveillance, 
intervention with, enforcement, compliance, and breach of, purportedly ‘high risk’ 
cases. A three-tiered risk management system (ranging from Levels 1 to 3) is used to 
target resources at those perceived as posing the highest level of risk (Level 3). The risk 
level of the individual therefore determines the degree of restrictive, rehabilitative and 
protective interventions put in place to manage risk, and the extent to which information 
is shared between the agencies involved in MAPPA. The Home Office and latterly the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) have issued various guidance manuals to MAPPA (e.g. MoJ 
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2007; 2012) and subsequent evaluations of the public protection arrangements have 
been conducted which outline the risk management procedures used in relation to RSOs 
(e.g. Maguire et al. 2001; Kemshall et al. 2005; Wood and Kemshall 2007; see also 
Kemshall 2008; Wood and Kemshall 2008). An area of concern that has been given 
increasing recognition is the need for consistency in practice across the different 42 
MAPPA areas in England and Wales.  In particular, the need to ensure that all RSOs are 
allocated to the appropriate level of risk management and that the imposition and use of 
SOPOs during this time was appropriate. Similar concerns over consistency were also 
raised by Hudson et al. (2015). These findings highlighted an uneven distribution of 
RSOs and variations in risk-level allocations both geographically (between the 42 
MAPPA areas) and over time (from 2004/5 to 2010/11), again raising a number of 
concerns about the fairness of MAPPA practice. 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine further the incidence of RSOs 
alongside the use and consistency of preventative measures against further offending. 
Specifically this paper is interested in the use and consistency of the SOPO5, as well as 
the use of sanctions relating to the breach of SOPOs and the notification requirements. 
The primary data used in this analysis were derived from the annual reports for the 42 
designated MAPPA areas in England and Wales over a nine-year period, from 2004/5 to 
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2012/13. We have therefore been able to examine consistency in the use of SOPOs over 
time and geographically.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following four ways. First, we examine 
in more detail a number of human rights concerns over the use of such preventative 
measures, specifically the notification requirements and the SOPO. Second, we describe 
how the data were collated and prepared for analysis. Third, we present the findings 
from fairly straightforward analyses of the data before, fourthly, discussing important 
insights into future practice and research. 
 
Just social policies versus public protection 
Numerous legislative responses have been introduced to protect the public and curb 
rising community concern about the release of convicted sexual offenders. Yet the rate 
of sexual reconviction for sexual offenders is known to be comparatively low, typically 
10 per cent to 15 per cent after five years (Bates et al. 2003; Harris and Hanson 2004; 
Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2005; Hoare and Jansson 2008; Kershall et al. 2008). 
Reconviction as an outcome measure, of course, fails to take into account unofficial 
levels of sexual re-offending (Falshaw et al. 2003), high attrition rates and/or difficulties 
in prosecution proceedings (Kelly et al. 2005; Taylor and Gassner 2010). Accordingly 
researchers now recommend the use of other outcome measures to supplement 
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reconviction data (Falshaw et al 2003). Similarly, it is accepted that research examining 
repeat offending of convicted sexual offenders should also take into account the offence 
characteristics of different subtypes of sexual offenders (Craig et al. 2003; Smallbone et 
al. 2008; Finkelhor 2009; Butler et al. 2012) as well as the impact of any intervention or 
management strategies (Stalans 2004; Hanson et al. 2009; Brown 2010; Peck 2011; 
Butler et al. 2012) which have been shown to account for differences in recidivism 
rates.  
Despite these methodological challenges, the observed recidivism rate is ‘less than 
commonly believed’ (Mann et al. 2010: 192).  Thus MAPPA and the associated 
measures that supervise, control and monitor RSOs in the community have been 
extensively criticised for responding to an over-exaggerated level of risk reflecting the 
‘Othering’ of those convicted of sexual offences.  This has largely been attributed to the 
concept of ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms 1995: 40) in addition to the influence of the 
media who stand accused of inflating public awareness, concern and fear of sexual 
offending within the narrow stereotypes of ‘stranger’ and ‘predator danger’ (see inter 
alia Cobley 2000; Greer 2003; Brayford and Deering 2012). Indeed, the increased 
policy focus on sexual offending during the 1990s led Soothill et al. (1998) to coin the 
phrase ‘criminal apartheid’ to account for the way in which sexual crimes were 
differentiated from other forms of offending. This trend has evidently continued with 
few other offence-groups6 having been singled out in such ways (Blandford & Beech 
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2011). The appropriation of criminal justice resources based on public demand and/or 
media recommendations (see Critcher 2002) has been extensively criticised for failing 
to meet the real needs of current or future victims (see Greer 2003; Kitzinger 1999, 
2004a, 2004b). Of interest to this paper, is how policies based on so-called 
‘precautionary logic’ (see Ericson 2007; Hebenton and Seddon 2009) neglect to take 
into account an RSO’s basic rights. 
Many of the measures cited above have previously been regarded as acceptable due to 
their aim at ex ante prevention of crime rather than ex post punishment (see Schauer 
2013). However, this argument is being challenged due to the increasing severity of 
measures being regarded as effectively imposing or increasing further punishments 
which extend the original sentence. Thomas (2008) questions whether the ‘sex offenders 
register’, which is supposedly not a ‘punishment for a sexual offence [nor] part of the 
system of penalties’ (Home Office 2012a: 9), now, due to numerous changes since its 
introduction, constitutes a punishment in its own right. Indeed, when introducing these 
changes, the Home Office stated that current registrants were ‘required to comply with 
all requirements of the notification regime, including the new matters set out in the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Notification Requirements) (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2012’ (2012b: 1; emphasis added). This included a reduction in the number 
of days an individual had to make initial and subsequent notifications, a requirement to 
provide identification at each notification (including finger prints and photographs), the 
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requirement to notify any address at which they stayed for more than twelve hours 
where a child aged under 18 resided and the requirement to provide details of their bank 
accounts. Failure to comply with these new requirements constitutes a separate criminal 
offence punishable by up to five year’s imprisonment (Home Office 2012b: 1).  
This opens up current legislation to a number of human rights concerns and possible 
breaches of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which is enshrined 
into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. The retrospective nature of the 
changes outlined above raises important questions regarding their ex post facto nature 
and whether they in fact breach article 7 (on ‘retroactivity’) and article 8 (on ‘the right 
to respect for privacy and family life’) of the ECHR.  Following article 8.2, where 
measures aimed at improving ‘public safety’ or ‘the prevention of disorder or crime’ are 
not ‘necessary in a democratic society’, they may become susceptible to challenge7.  
Domestic courts appear to have reached the position that whilst inclusion on the ‘sex 
offender register’ engages article 8 it does not necessarily breach it (see Thomas 2011: 
76-79). However, more recent case law has challenged the requirement that those 
sentenced to 30 months or more for a qualifying offence are automatically placed on the 
register for life. In April 2010, the UK Supreme Court ruled8 that individuals so effected 
must be given the opportunity to apply for their names to be removed from the register, 
arguing that lifetime inclusion without the right of review was a violation of article 8. 
Consequently, the Home Office have introduced a review mechanism, albeit only after 
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15 years inclusion on the ‘register’ and within the context of the new more stringent 
measures just discussed. While the lawfulness of the review mechanism may well be 
questioned further, the government’s position remains that the new amendments do not 
breach human rights law (Home Office 2012b: 1).   
Similar rights and proportionality arguments arise when discussing the use and impact 
of the civil order introduced in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A SOPO is available to 
the courts when sentencing an individual for an offence listed in schedule 3 or schedule 
59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, or on the application of the police in respect of a 
person who has previously been dealt with for such an offence. Under a SOPO an 
individual will (if not already) become subject to the notification requirements and be 
subject to restrictions on their behaviour – for instance, prohibition from having 
unsupervised contact with children or from refusing police access to Internet-enabled 
devices in their possession in order to examine the content.  The minimum duration of a 
SOPO is five years, but orders can be made for an indefinite period of time and 
therefore can remain in place until discharged, varied or renewed by the courts. Whilst a 
court cannot discharge an order within five years (without the consent of both its subject 
and the chief police officer from the relevant area) it has become the accepted position 
of the appeal courts10 that the duration of a SOPO should match the duration of the 
notification requirements imposed.  This applies particularly where an order is being 
made at the same time as the sentencing for an offence.   
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Section 104 of the 2003 Act, under which applications for a SOPO are granted, contains 
the statutory ‘test’ that the imposition of an order should occur only when ‘there is a 
reasonable cause to believe that an order is necessary to protect the public, or 
individual members of the public, from serious sexual harm’11 (Home Office 2012a: 44; 
emphasis added).  Moreover, ‘a key factor to be considered is the risk presented by the 
defendant’ with the risk, in this context, based on ‘the likelihood of the offender 
committing a sexual offence; the imminence of that offending; and the seriousness of 
the harm resulting from it’ (Home Office 2012a: 44).  Thus a SOPO, and ultimately its 
intrusive content, is imposed based upon a prediction of future behaviour. This risk 
assessment is undertaken throughout an RSO’s sentence using risk assessment tools 
such as the Offender Assessment System (OASys), actuarial measures such as Risk 
Matrix 2000, Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (SARN) for those in treatment 
programmes and, in the case of juveniles, ASSET. The most widely used actuarial risk-
assessment tool for sexual offenders in the English and Welsh Prison and Probation 
Services is the Risk Matrix 2000 (Thornton et al. 2003).  
 
The accuracy and predictive validity of actuarial instruments and the appropriateness of 
their use in predicting future offending has been widely debated and researched (see for 
example, Craig et al. 2006; Craig et al. 2008; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2009; 
Barnett et al. 2010). Current findings suggest that actuarial assessments outperform 
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unstructured clinical judgment with regard to assessing risk of recidivism (Hanson and 
Morton-Bourgon 2009). Accordingly, Barnett et al. (2010: 23), as with previous studies, 
found that the RM2000/S had ‘moderate predictive accuracy as a measure of relative 
risk, with a range of sexual offenders’. However, actuarial methods are not without their 
critics. Concerns over fairness immediately emerge from the possibility of false-positive 
outcomes when attempting to predict serious future offending amongst those subject to 
public protection measures.  False-positives, or wrongly predicting that an individual 
poses a ‘high risk of re-offending’, arguably threaten the article 8 ‘right to private and 
family life’ when such predictions lead to the imposition of measures (e.g. SOPOs) 
aimed at reducing any perceived risk. These arguments can equally apply to the 
imposition of notification requirements. It is worth remembering that the penalty for 
breaching such measures is a custodial sentence of up to five years. 
Whilst actuarial measures are favoured, a number of other sexual offender risk measures 
continue to be used. Questions therefore remain as to how to interpret different results 
from various risk assessment tools (Hanson and Morton-Bourgon 2009) and the role of 
professional judgment. Given the high stakes for RSOs, it is imperative that the 
assessments being used are as accurate as possible. It is therefore essential that research 
continues to examine each tool’s ability to measure relative risk, the purpose of risk 
assessments, and the role of professional judgment, in order to ensure that restrictive 
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measures put in place to manage those considered a higher risk of reoffending are 
applied fairly, consistently and only where strictly ‘necessary’.  
Data and methodology 
The data used within this paper were derived from MAPPA annual reports. These 
reports provide the public with information on how MAPPA operates and present 
statistical information on the individuals monitored across various risk-level 
categorisations.  For the period 2004/5 to 2010/11 the annual reports were accessed via 
the MoJ website and from the websites of the relevant police force or probation service 
for each area. Since 2010/11, this information has been collated centrally by the MoJ 
therefore centralised data were used to extend the time period to 2012/13. The data used 
within this paper thus covers a nine-year period from 2004/5 to 2012/13.  
Statistical information relating to ‘Category One’ cases (RSOs) was collated for each of 
the 42 MAPPA areas. This included the number of RSOs under MAPPA and the 
number of RSOs managed at Level 2 and Level 3 of the arrangements (from which the 
percentage managed at these ‘high’ and ‘critical risk’ levels was calculated). It also 
includes the number of RSOs convicted or cautioned for breach of the notification 
requirements, the number of full SOPOs imposed by the courts, and the number of 
Level 2 and 3 RSOs sent to custody for breaching a SOPO (although as we explain 
below these are not all presented as ‘raw’ figures).    
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It is important to note that the data represents the number of cases included on 31st 
March for each corresponding year, like a form of census data. The total number of 
cases that were managed may have fluctuated between each census date. The same also 
applies to the risk-level allocation of RSOs, SOPOs and breach figures. Crucially 
however, the same census date was used consistently across all 42 MAPPA areas.  
Slight differences were observed for the period 2004/5 to 2010/11 when comparing data 
extracted from individual MAPPA area reports with official national statistics provided 
by the MoJ. These minor differences can possibly be explained by timing differences in 
the recording of these data, and due to the outcome of some convictions or cautions 
being overturned at a later date on appeal. For the majority of statistics, however, the 
number of RSOs over the nine-year period was broadly consistent with the figures 
provided within annual MoJ statistical bulletins.   
Reported MAPPA data only provides total figures for each area across different 
measures such as the actual number of SOPOs imposed or RSOs convicted and 
cautioned for breaching notification requirements in each area. Given the large disparity 
in the number of RSOs managed in different areas these figures were not directly 
comparable between or across areas. This is because certain MAPPA areas cover much 
larger numbers of people in the population generally, for instance London and the West 
Midlands areas. In this paper, we therefore reproduce the total number of RSOs 
managed by MAPPA each year across England and Wales as a whole. We also 
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reproduce nationwide data on risk-level allocation, as a percentage of RSOs managed at 
levels 2 and 3 of MAPPA, per year, as well as on the use of preventative measures 
against sexual offending and sanctions for their breach as relative annual rates, i.e. per 
100 RSOs, per year. The use of proxy measures based on relative rates allowed for 
correlations to be calculated between these measures using Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients (r).   
Our research does not therefore report actual numbers of RSOs, preventative measures 
and sanctions for their breach in each area. The reasons for this are twofold.  Firstly, 
without standardising the data in this way, as stated above, comparisons between the 
different MAPPA areas are meaningless. Secondly, by not providing the actual numbers 
of RSOs in each area (or numbers of SOPOs imposed) we avoid ‘sensationalising’ the 
data since it is important to bear in mind that the actual number of RSOs in any given 
area is very small in relation to the size of the general population. Whilst these 
standardised figures, or rates, remain mostly descriptive, they allow for the comparison 
of inter-area consistency (and fairness) in the use of preventative justice measures aimed 
at reducing sexual offending.   
 
Analysis of MAPPA data on ‘Registered Sexual Offenders’ 
The following section presents findings from fairly straightforward analyses of the data 
which explores both the use of public protection measures over time and inter-area (in-) 
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consistency. Table 1 provides data on the total number of RSOs across England and 
Wales between 2004/5 and 2012/13, risk-level allocation of RSOs12, the rate at which 
SOPOs have been imposed and sanctions for breaching them (in the case of ‘higher 
risk’ RSOs13) as well as the rate of convictions and cautions for those that breach the 
notification requirements. These data show trends across all 42 MAPPA areas in 
England and Wales combined. In Table 2 we then compare the management of RSOs 
between the 42 MAPPA areas in England and Wales across the nine-year period since 
the implementation of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Table 2 also provides data on risk-
level allocation, the relative rates at which SOPOs were imposed and the relative rate of 
sanctions for breaching the notification requirements on an area-by-area basis.  These 
are presented as the nine-year mean rates based on the end of year calculations of those 
rates from 2004/5 to 2012/13. 
Table 1: Numbers of RSOs and relative rates of the use of public protection 
measures in England and Wales over time (2004/5 to 2012/13) 
Year 
 
 
Total number 
of RSOs 
managed 
under 
MAPPA  
% of RSOs 
managed at 
Level 2 or 3 of 
MAPPA 
SOPOs 
imposed 
(per 100 
RSOs) 
Level 2 & 3 
RSOs sent to 
custody for 
breaching a 
SOPO (per 100 
RSOs at these 
levels)  
Convictions or 
cautions for 
breach of 
notification 
requirements 
(per 100 RSOs) 
2004/5 28,994 20.82 1.50 1.46     3.24 
2005/6 29,983 20.79 3.06 2.58   3.85 
2006/7 30,416 21.00 3.61 1.89     4.79 
2007/8 31,392 18.30 4.50 1.68     4.55 
2008/9 32,347 14.88 4.70 1.84     3.33 
2009/10 34,939 5.84 5.31 6.59     3.55 
2010/11 37,225 4.19 6.55 6.89     3.38 
2011/12 40,345 2.98 6.56 10.59     2.90 
2012/13 43,664 2.24 7.02 14.56   2.99 
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Table 2: Relative rates in the use of public protection measures across 
MAPPA areas in England and Wales (2004/5 to 2012/13) 
MAPPA Area 
% of RSOs 
managed at 
Level 2 or 3 of 
MAPPA 
SOPOs 
imposed 
(per 100 
RSOs)  
Convictions or cautions for 
breach of notification 
requirements (per 100 
RSOs) 
Avon & Somerset 12.62 6.45 1.32 
Bedfordshire 7.71 8.19 2.31 
Cambridgeshire 11.31 6.87 2.83 
Cheshire 22.93 4.14 1.42 
County Durham 6.00 7.73 3.16 
Cumbria 7.63 7.66 3.83 
Derbyshire 10.17 6.32 4.00 
Devon & Cornwall 12.46 7.18 4.40 
Dorset 8.16 4.72 3.05 
Dyfed-Powys 17.42 4.14 2.85 
Essex 4.66 4.80 8.34 
Gloucestershire 13.47 6.94 3.14 
Gt. Manchester 4.79 3.05 3.22 
Gwent 8.41 4.81 3.83 
Hampshire 20.75 3.68 2.97 
Hertfordshire 8.98 7.41 4.53 
Humberside 5.52 6.89 3.45 
Kent 12.98 7.30 3.38 
Lancashire 5.43 6.49 7.09 
Leics. & Rutland 7.63 3.35 3.16 
Lincolnshire 8.27 4.61 2.75 
London 29.64 1.64 8.65 
Merseyside 6.82 4.05 4.28 
Norfolk 5.62 4.18 1.88 
North Wales 17.23 6.57 3.76 
North Yorkshire 7.88 6.63 2.91 
Northamptonshire 9.16 6.22 2.91 
Northumbria 6.58 5.73 7.95 
Nottinghamshire 8.36 2.98 4.41 
South Wales 21.38 3.20 2.09 
South Yorkshire 6.17 4.20 1.91 
Staffordshire 18.35 3.11 2.02 
Suffolk 5.84 6.09 2.79 
Surrey 16.78 5.05 3.30 
Sussex 7.63 4.10 3.12 
Teesside 5.84 10.74 4.42 
Thames Valley 14.46 3.81 2.77 
Warwickshire 12.09 4.60 3.65 
West Mercia 7.95 5.21 4.50 
West Midlands 12.96 3.46 4.31 
West Yorkshire 4.89 8.80 2.92 
Wiltshire 9.30 4.93 2.19 
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Table 1 clearly shows that the overall number of RSOs in England and Wales has 
steadily risen over the nine-year period in which the data were recorded (2004/5 to 
2012/13). This is arguably indicative of the cumulative effect of long notification 
periods which in some cases are indefinite. Predictably, there are fewer individuals 
leaving the ‘register’ than are joining it. However, the data also shows a marked 
decrease in the proportion of RSOs being managed at the ‘high’ and ‘critical’ levels of 
risk (Levels 2 and 3). Accounting for this decrease in the overall number of ‘higher risk’ 
RSOs in England and Wales over a seven-year period, Hudson et at. (2015) 
acknowledge that this may have been the result of central guidance, including changes 
to the definition of the ‘critical few’ in 2003 (Home Office 2003) and/or a break from 
the initial ‘precautionary principles’, ‘better safe than sorry’ and ‘defensive response’ to 
the perceived risks of sexual offenders (Kemshall & Wood 2008: 611). A further 
positive interpretation is that high-risk RSOs are being effectively managed through 
MAPPA, resulting in case management decisions to reclassify them as lower risk 
(Hudson et al. 2015).  However, reiterating the questions posed in Hudson et al. (2015: 
12); firstly, if any of these explanations were valid, would the decline in numbers be as 
dramatic as the analysis suggests? And secondly, why would the rate of decline vary so 
dramatically between MAPPA areas? Indeed, looking at this data over a nine year 
period (see Table 2) the average rate ranges from 29.64 in London down to only 4.66 in 
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(neighbouring) Essex – or a proportion of ‘higher risk’ cases six times greater in 
London.    
 
What is important to this study is that despite this consistent (and expected) increase in 
the total number of RSOs, the proportion of cases managed at Levels 2 and 3 has shown 
a marked decrease at the same time as a considerable increase in the rate at which 
SOPOs have been imposed across England and Wales. Table 1 clearly shows that the 
rate at which SOPOs have been imposed by courts has increased dramatically following 
their introduction in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Critically, this increase is not 
attributable to overall changes in the number of RSOs managed under MAPPA as our 
figures show the relative rate at which SOPOs were imposed (per 100 RSOs, per year).  
This trend may be a consequence of greater familiarity with the processes of applying 
for and imposing SOPOs amongst police and Crown prosecutors. It could also reflect 
the different points of time at which an order can be obtained, pointing to an increase in 
the use of a SOPO under s.104 (1) (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Here, the 
‘Relevant Chief Officer’ can apply for an order after the date of conviction if ‘satisfied 
that the defendant’s behaviour since the appropriate date makes it necessary’.  However, 
the relationship between the annual figures for the proportion of RSOs managed at 
levels 2 and 3 of MAPPA and the rate at which SOPOs were imposed by the courts 
shows a statistically significant negative relationship (r= -0.91, p<0.01).  Whilst much 
19 
 
needed clarification of the boundaries of ‘necessity’ when imposing SOPOs was 
provided in July 2012 by the Court of Appeal14, our data clearly underlines the need for 
further research into their use.  Indeed, given that a SOPO lasts for a minimum period of 
five years, a large number of these orders are likely to be in place with lower risk RSOs 
managed at MAPPA level 1. 
Table 1 also shows that the rate at which RSOs were convicted or cautioned for 
breaching the notification requirements increased steadily up until 2006/7 before 
beginning to decline. Historically, a higher proportion of RSOs being subject to more 
intensive ‘risk management’ seems to bear some relation (if not a strictly ‘significant’ 
one, r=0.66, p=0.053) to the rate at which convictions and cautions for breaching the 
notification requirements were dispensed. It should be noted that the highest rate of 
convictions and cautions coincided with the period when the highest proportion of 
RSOs was managed at levels 2 and 3, with a lower rate observed in recent years (when 
far fewer RSOs were managed at these levels). From 2008/9 onward a significantly 
lower proportion of RSOs have been managed at the more intensive management levels 
2 and 3 which may account, to some extent, for the drop in the annual rate since 
breaches might be being detected less often due to the more infrequent contact with 
police public protection units (PPUs) amongst those RSOs previously managed at levels 
2 or 3.    
20 
 
This table also shows the rate at which level 2 and 3 RSOs were sent to custody for 
breaching a SOPO.  The perceived increase in the rate at which custodial sentences have 
been passed for SOPO breaches from 2009/10 onwards is the result of a much smaller 
number of RSOs being managed at MAPPA levels 2 and 3. This has the effect of 
magnifying the rate in comparison to previous years.  For this reason, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether responses to proven breaches have simply become more punitive or 
whether the reduction in the proportion of RSOs managed at levels 2 and 3 has enabled 
PPUs to be more effective in their policing of compliance with SOPOs.  Given these 
difficulties, we have not included data on sanctions for SOPO breaches in the 
comparisons of inter-area consistency to which we now turn. 
When comparing the rate at which SOPOs were used between the 42 MAPPA areas in 
England and Wales across the same time period (in Table 2) there is also evidence of 
inter-area inconsistency. Teesside for example, imposed orders at an average rate of 
10.74 (per 100 RSOs, per year) whilst the comparable rate for London was only 1.64.  
Therefore RSOs were, on average, more than six times more likely to have been made 
the subject of a SOPO (which could result in their imprisonment if breached) if they 
lived (or were sentenced) in Teesside than if they were in London.  Rather 
incongruously given that they were statistically least likely to be subjected to a SOPO, 
RSOs in London were over six times more likely to receive a conviction or caution for 
breaching their notification requirement (8.65 sanctions per 100 RSOs, per year) than 
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their counterparts in Avon and Somerset who were the least likely to be sanctioned for 
breaches (1.32 sanctions per 100 RSOs, per year).   
There was no correlation between the average rates at which SOPOs were imposed 
across MAPPA areas with the average rates at which RSOs were convicted or cautioned 
for breaching the notification requirements (r=-0.04, p=0.80). Nor was there any 
correlation between the average percentage of RSOs managed at the ‘higher risk’ levels 
2 and 3 of MAPPA and the rate of breaches (r=-0.03, p=0.85). Therefore, when 
comparing practice across areas, higher rates of sanctions for non-compliance with 
notification requirements did not appear to be linked to higher use of SOPOs or higher 
levels of RSOs assessed as posing a greater risk to the public.  Interestingly, the rates at 
which SOPOs were used showed a significant but moderate negative correlation (r=-
0.43, p<0.01) with higher reported average percentages of RSOs managed at levels 2 
and 3. The opposite relation might have been expected with more ‘high risk’ RSOs 
being associated with more orders to protect against ‘serious sexual harm.’ 
Concluding remarks 
This research has examined the incidence of RSOs and the use of civil prevention orders 
with the intention of examining the extent to which these measures are being used 
consistently. Collating and utilising data published by the 42 MAPPA areas of England 
and Wales from 2004/05 to 2010/11, and MAPPA data collated centrally from 2010/11-
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2012/13, we were able to highlight variations over time (over a nine year period) and 
geographically across the different MAPPA areas in a number of ways: firstly, in the 
risk allocation of RSOs; secondly in the administration of SOPOs, and thirdly in the use 
of sanctions for non-compliance with MAPPA.  
A number of tentative arguments have been put forward to account for this variation. 
For example, the variation in the way that risk is being assessed most likely reflects 
institutional differences (see also Hudson et al. 2015). The imposition of a SOPO, 
similarly, appears to be strongly influenced by localised preference across MAPPA 
areas, rather than due to the risk management level to which RSOs have been allocated 
there. Both explanations may reflect the cost of resourcing MAPPA practices over time. 
Resourcing issues could, for example, account for the apparent downwards trend in the 
use of higher risk categories in the risk level allocation. Our data certainly raises 
questions as to whether the increase in the rate at which SOPOs have been used reflects 
the problem of shrinking resources and a need to find a more efficient and/or cheaper 
alternative to ‘managing’ RSOs previously monitored at MAPPA levels two and three.  
Clearly a limitation of using this kind of data and approach is that such explanations can 
only be considered to be proxies for the underlying variations. Only further detailed 
research, such as that undertaken in the USA (for example, Tewksbury & Mustaine 
2013), which includes local analysis, taking into account direct comparisons of offender 
types and practitioner attitudes and decisions across MAPPA areas would reveal this. 
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However, the tentative findings presented here would suggest that further exploration 
and study of these issues is warranted. Crucially, we would argue that this is necessary 
from a human rights perspective. To reiterate, the level of risk at which a RSO is 
managed has implications in terms of their rights and autonomy, determining both the 
degree of restrictive, rehabilitative and protective interventions put in place to manage 
risk, and the extent to which information is shared between agencies involved in 
MAPPA. The apparent variations in the risk-level allocation of RSOs reinforce existing 
concerns surrounding the accuracy and predictability of different risk assessment tools 
and professional decision making techniques. The variation in the rates of level 2 and 3 
RSOs and the use of SOPOs between MAPPA areas suggests an acceptability and/or 
tolerance of ‘false positive’ outcomes, which disregard an RSO’s basic rights (Ericson, 
2007; Hebenton and Seddon, 2009). While MAPPA guidance aims to negate any bias, 
our data clearly questions whether the guidance is clear enough to ensure that all 
MAPPA areas follow it in the same way.  
Human rights concerns become even more pertinent when you consider the punishment 
for non-compliance with crime prevention measures such as SOPOs and the notification 
requirements. Indeed, while the compliance rate for registration is high, this may 
actually reflect the fact that breach of notification requirements is an offence in its own 
right, attracting up to five years imprisonment. Similarly, breach of court orders can 
demand the same sentence. While our data shows that the number of RSOs convicted or 
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cautioned for breaching the notification requirements has declined, the apparent 
variations between the proportion of RSOs managed at MAPPA levels 2 and 3 and the 
sanctions for non-compliance in each MAPPA area, raises questions about fairness and 
legitimacy.  
Recent changes made in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, as 
well as the recommendations made in the Davies Report (Davies 2013) on civil 
prevention orders widens the net of who will be subject to the measures discussed in 
this paper.  It has been argued that the changes do not pose any fundamental human 
rights objections (including those discussed earlier in relation to Article 8 of the ECHR, 
which concerns the ‘Right to Respect for Private and Family Life’) and that any 
additional restrictions or decisions to widen the net to include individuals with ‘no 
qualifying conviction’ (see for example Davies 2013) is necessary and justifiable in 
order to protect children and adults from sexual abuse. While this paper comes from the 
same purposive starting point, it raises questions over the precautionary logic that may 
be driving such decisions. More importantly, it recognises that while there is clearly a 
need to protect the public from sexual abuse and to ensure that the legislation covers all 
eventualities, the measures administered need to be reasonable, proportionate, just or if 
nothing else, appropriately targeted rather than universally applied.  
It is therefore imperative that we have accurate data on MAPPA Practice. At the very 
least, our findings remind us that the practices of managing (and controlling) RSOs are 
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a social process and are thus susceptible to variations in those practices which may not 
necessarily reflect their intended design and guidance. The level of variations in practice 
shown in this paper supports the need for further research into the consistency of 
MAPPA practice to ensure that the need to manage RSOs is matched appropriately to an 
accurate prediction of future risk.  
Notes 
 
1 The Sex Offenders Register was introduced in the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and later 
amended in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (CJCSA) 2000 and the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. 
2 MAPPA were introduced into legislation through the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Service Act (CJCSA) 2000 and Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003. These arrangements 
have been subject to research evaluations (Maguire et al 2001; Kemshall et al. 2005; 
Wood and Kemshall 2007) and guidance (see for example, Home Office 2003; 2004; 
2007; MoJ 2007; 2012).  MAPPA involves a tiered system of risk management of 
registered sexual offenders (category 1), violent offenders (category 2) and ‘other 
dangerous offenders’ (category 3) at Level 1 (low/medium risk), Level 2 (high risk) or 
Level 3 (critical risk).  For more information see MoJ (2007; 2012). 
3 These regulations increased the amount of information that RSOs are obliged to 
provide to the police as part of the notification requirements under the Act. 
4 We are not uncritical of the use of the term ‘offender’ in relation to individuals who 
are not necessarily still involved in criminal offending and therefore use the term RSO 
within this paper merely due to its use as a category within the official MAPPA 
documentation. 
5 The SOPO has since been replaced by the SHPO. Other civil orders discussed do not 
form part of our analysis as they are used comparatively rarely. 
6 Although ‘Claire’s Law’, a national domestic violence disclosure scheme, has now 
been implemented for violent offenders (see Strickland 2013). 
7 It should be noted that the term ‘necessary’ imports a higher threshold of consideration 
for courts than if such measures were merely ‘desirable’.  See for instance the 
judgements in R v Halloren [2004] EWCA Crim 233, para. 14, available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2004/233.html and R v Hemsley [2010] 
EWCA Crim 225, available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2010/225.html  
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8 In R (on the application of F (by his litigation friend F)) and Thompson (FC) 
(Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) [2010] UKSC 
17, available at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/17.html 
9 Offences listed in schedule 5 are not sexual offences. Schedule 5 includes murder as 
well as all the offences in Schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which relate to 
"dangerous offenders”. 
10 See R v Hammond [2008] EWCA Crim 1358, available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1358.html. 
11 This phrasing is no doubt designed to ensure compliance with article 8.2 of the 
ECHR. 
12 The variations in risk-level allocation are explored in much greater detail in Hudson 
et al. (2015). 
13 MAPPA data were not provided on RSOs managed at level 1 (‘low’ or ‘medium 
risk’) who are sent to custody for breaching their SOPO. 
14 See Smith & Ors, R. v (Rev 1) [2011] EWCA Crim 1772 (19 July 2011), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/1772.html 
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